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Abstract
We show that a simple and intuitive three-parameter equation fits remarkably
well the evolution of the gross domestic product (GDP) in current and constant
dollars of many countries during times of recession and recovery. We then argue
that this equation is the response function of the economy to isolated shocks, hence
that it can be used to detect large and small shocks, including those which do not
lead to a recession; we also discuss its predictive power. Finally, a two-sector toy
model of recession and recovery illustrates how the severity and length of recession
depends on the dynamics of transfer rate between the growing and failing parts of
the economy.
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1 Introduction
Explaining growth and recessions has been central to Economics ever since its begin-
ning (Quesnay 1888; Smith 2000; Ricardo 2004; Keynes 2007; Solow 2000; Schumpeter
1980; Romer 1990; Robbins 2000). Since recessions and subsequent recoveries are
usually split into distinct episodes in economic analysis, the factors of decline and
growth have been investigated separately (e.g. Popov (2006); Kolodko (2000); Cernat
(2002)) and little attention has been devoted to the intrinsic relationship between reces-
sion and recovery.
Here we argue that
1. recessions and their subsequent recoveries can be fitted rather well by a single
3-parameter function that contains both the recession and the recovery parts. It
assumes that during recession-recovery periods, at any time a fraction of the
economy is shrinking exponentially while the rest is growing exponentially. As
a consequence the two parts of the GDP curve are intrinsically linked and cannot
be considered as separate events. In particular, we show why this yields much
better estimates of the decaying and expansion rates.
2. The shape of this function is the simplest one that respects the underlying eco-
nomic process: economic activity grows and shrinks exponentially. A more
complex superposition of exponentials or non-constant parameters is of course
possible, as discussed below.
3. It is valid as long as no other shock occurs, thus can be used a contrario to sepa-
rate a GDP time series into episodes of economic growth, providing a factinating
new way of reading the fluctuations of GDP time series, even outside times of
recessions. This leads to the conclusion that this model is in fact the response
function of the economy as a whole to rare negative shocks, both exo- and endo-
geneous.
In section 2, we consider the yearly evolution of countries having experienced last-
ing recessions others than those due to wars, which include many of the former com-
munist block economies following their liberalisation. We find that our “universal
recession-recovery shape” fits all of them well between shocks and that each additional
shock brings a new episode fitted by our equation. Its accuracy, and in particular, the
smooth shape of GDP evolution between shocks it implies, is confirmed to a high de-
gree by quarterly data for Finland and the United Kingdom. We illustrate how this
equation can be used to detect additional shocks automatically.
In section 3, as a theoretical exercise, we introduce a simple two-sector model of
growth with economic transfer. We also discuss why a simple two sector model is able
to reproduce faithfully the typical global dynamics of recession-recovery. Then we
exploit this understanding in order to find an effective transfer rate that minimises the
depth and duration of the recession, and maximises both the GDP value and the final
growth rate. We finally propose a means to differentiate static from dynamical effective
policies in historical data.
2 Data analysis
The economic activity of many countries shows dramatic and sudden decreases fol-
lowed by a slow road to recovery, a pattern commonly known in Economics as L, U or
2
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Figure 1: Time evolution of the GDP in current dollars of 23 countries, and the fits to
Eq. (1)
1990 2000
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
AlbaniaGDP
1990 1996
95
100
105
110
115
120
Bahamas
1990 1996 2002
70
80
90
100
110
Belarus
1985 1995
90
100
110
120
130
140
Bolivia
1985 1995
100
150
200
250
Chile
1990 2000
70
80
90
100
110
EstoniaGDP
1990 1996 2002
90
100
110
120
130
Finland
1990 2000
90
100
110
120
Hungary
1990 1996 2002
60
70
80
90
100
Kazakhstan
1990 2000
50
60
70
80
90
100
Latvia
1990 1996 2002
60
70
80
90
100
LithuaniaGDP
1990 1996 2002
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
Mongolia
1990 2000
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Moldova, Rep
1990 2000
60
70
80
90
100
Russian Fed.
1990 2000
80
90
100
110
120
Slovakia
1990 1996 2002
90
100
110
120
130
SloveniaGDP
1990 1996 2002
100
110
120
130
Sweden
1990 1994 1998
50
60
70
80
90
100
Turkmenistan
1990 1995 2000
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Ukraine
1990 1996 2002
80
90
100
110
120
UzbekistanGDP
1990 1995 2000
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Bulgaria
1990 1996 2002
90
95
100
105
110
115
Czech Rep
1990 1995 2000
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Romania
Figure 2: Time evolution of the GDP in constant dollars of 23 countries and the fits to
Eq. (1)
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J-shape depending on the state of unfolding of the J shape (Cernat 2002). Our dataset,
taken from http://data.uno.org , starts in 1980. We retained the 23 countries hav-
ing undergone recessions of at least three consecutive years, as we need enough points
in the recession part to estimate correctly the rate of decay. Among these countries one
finds many of the previously communist Eastern European countries; Finland, because
of the strong links between its economy and those of the Eastern Block, suffered from
the same crisis; Sweden had a crisis of its own at about the same time, caused by the
burst of a real estate and financial bubble. Bolivia, Bahamas and Chile follow the same
pattern, at different times, for reasons unknown to us.
2.1 Yearly GDP data
We focus on gross domestic product (GDP) both in current and constant dollars. The
latter is also called real GDP as it discounts inflation and makes is possible to better
compare economic activity from year to year and between countries. As we shall see,
however, it is more irregular, in part because of the dynamics of currency exchange
rates, which in turn reflects partially that of interest rates and differences in budget
deficits.
As it turns out, most of these recessions were caused by political and taxation re-
forms or financial crises; in other words, by events localized in time, that is, sudden
shocks. In order to cause long recessions, these shocks must be large and affect much
of the economy. One key assumption in the following is that the intrinsic economic
parameters (fraction of the economy affected, growth and decay rates) are or appear
to be constant ever after a shock. We shall not attempt to model the occurrence and
properties of shocks. Figure 1 reports the evolution of the GDP in current dollars of
several countries, revealing a common pattern. These recessions can be characterised
by their intensity (maximum loss of GDP), the time of the minimum GDP and the time
to recover the previous level of economic production. The evolution of the GDP in
constant dollars (Fig. 2) shows similar patterns.
Remarkably, all previously communist Eastern European and Soviet Union coun-
tries have experienced a lasting recession followed by a recovery. Some countries such
as Romania, Bulgaria and the Czechia clearly display a double dip (Figs 1 and 2). As
it happens, the onsets of the second dips of Romania and Bulgaria is unambiguously
related to a change of power, suggesting that wrong economic policies or implementa-
tions may be blamed for further degradation of the situation.
The severity and duration of the recession varies widely between the countries:
Poland has recovered very quickly (too much so to be shown in Figs. 1 and 2), while
some countries such a Russia and Latvia have come back to their previous current-
dollar GDP in 2006. The Republic of Moldova was still 50% down in 2006. We shall
not try to find the causes of such differences, although our fitting equation directly
provides information about the fraction of the economy which is decaying, but shall
discuss various ways of optimising a policy with the help of a simple theoretical model
in secion 3.
For reasons explained below, we parametrise the GDP J shapes as displayed in Figs
1 and 2, in terms of the following formula
W (t) =W (t0)[ f eλ+(t−t0)+(1− f )eλ−(t−t0)], (1)
where
• W (t0) is the initial GDP at the time t0 of the reform
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• f is the fraction of the economy that grows at rate λ+;
• the rest of the economy (1− f ) deflates at rate λ−
A J-shaped W is obtained if W ′(t0)< 0, i.e. if f λ++(1− f )λ− < 0.
The fit of recession and recovery times of 23 countries appears remarkable (the
details are reported in appendix A). Since it uses constant parameters, it may a priori
suggest a surprising degree of constancy of rates of decline and growth; however, as
discussed in section 4, dynamic effective policies can also be relatively well fitted with
the same model: one needs data more detailled than the global GDP time series to
detect them.
The fitting function of Eq. 1 can be considered as the simplest model of recession
and recovery that is economically meaningful. Indeed, it only assumes that one part of
the economy shrinks while the other one grows, both exponentially. It does not include
many other a priori relevant parameters. It might seem tempting to fit the dips with
a parabola, which of course give terrible results as the GDP curves are not symmetric
and have an asymptotic constant exponential growth rate. Because of the auto-catalytic
nature of economic growth and recessions, only a sum of exponential makes sense,
which also excludes other candidates such as splines (which need many more than 3
parameters).
Given the simplicity of the fitting function and the complexity of the underlying
process, it is to be expected that the fits should not be perfect. Beyond gentle noise,
one finds two types of deviations. First, during the recession phase, the GDP of some
countries (e.g. Albania, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Turkmenistan) is concave, especially
in the very first part of the recession, which is impossible to achieve with the above
equation. This probably comes from the fact that our model implicitely assumes that
the economic shock affects all the sectors of the economy at once. A solution would
be that the fraction of the deflating part 1− f (t) increases, for instance 1− f (t) =
(1− f )[1−e−t/τ] where τ is the typical speed at which the shock propagates throughout
the economy.
Another story is told by systematic irregularities in the recovery part: most of them
are negative deviations. Many countries experienced a temporary pause in their growth,
sometimes a short-lived recession, and a few countries a lasting secondary recession.
Because we have only annual data, and since one needs at least three consecutive points
for a good fit of the recession part, we chose in some cases to fit the whole time se-
ries instead of fitting these episodes separately. The use of quarterly data solves this
problem and, importantly, allows one to uncover additional economic shocks that do
not necessarily lead to recessions, as seen in subsection 2.4. We could trace possi-
ble causes of some additional shocks: Albania suffered from a bank crisis in 1996,
and Finland from the burst of the 2000 internet bubble (see also subsection 2.4). The
worst secondary shocks were born by Romania and Bulgaria (1996 elections), and
Czechia (2000 bank crisis) which resulted into a second dip. This raises the question
on whether the second reforms were successful or on the contrary detrimental: com-
paring the values of λ+, λ− and f before and after the secondary shock, one concludes
that, according to our model, the crisis in Czechia had long-term positive effects, both
the rates of expansion and decline having much improved, at the cost of the initial frac-
tion of the expanding sector. The case of Romania is best described as bis repetita (non
placuerunt): the second crisis leading to almost the same fitting parameters as the first
one. Finally, Bulgaria has spurious results regarding the first shock (GDP in constant
dollars), which is due to the fact that GDP was mostly decreasing, hence the fit could
not assess correctly the growing part of the economy, finding it very small (from 0.2%
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Figure 3: Scaled real quarterly GDP of Finland from 04/1990 without fit (left) and with
two fits and the continuation of the pre-1990 growth trend (dotted line).
Finland f λ+ λ−
–1990 NA 0.0082± 0.0001 NA
1990–2001 (0–42) 0.768± 0.006 0.0121± 0.0002 −0.176± 0.010
2001–2008 (42–71) 0.925± 0.016 0.0106± 0.0006 −0.143± 0.040
Table 1: Result of the fits of Eq. (1) to the real GDP of Finland.
to 2%), but doing very well. This result is clearly wrong but easily reproduceable with
other countries if one restricts the data so as to only include a very small part of the
recovery. The figures obtained for the second shock are in line with all the other shocks
experienced by the other 22 countries.
2.2 Quarterly data
Quarterly data is available for the recent history of industrialised countries. Let us first
focus on Finland whose 1990 recession was analyzed in the previous subsection. Figure
3a plots the real GDP of Finland without any fit. While the recession and subsequent
recovery are easy to spot with naked eyes, it is much harder to make sense of the
fluctuations in the recovery part. As claimed above, the fitting equation that we propose
provides a new way to interpret such plots. Figure 3b adds the fit of the 1990 recession,
which is even more impressive than for yearly data (note that we do not use lin-log
axis, that would make the fit even more impressive). Given the faithfulness of our
three-parameter model for the first 41 quarters (more than 8 years), one must conclude
that something sudden happened to the GDP dynamics. This can be traced to the burst
of the Internet bubble and subsequent weak growth of the world during these years,
which resulted in a sharp decrease of demand for paper products and mobile phones,
which contributed to half of the exports of the country at the time. Assuming that
the shock was restricted in time, we can once again fit the next period as nicely with
the same equation. It is revealing to compare the parameters of the fits of the three
episodes (before 1990, 1990–2001, 2001-2008). We have λ(−1990)+ < λ(2001−2008)+ <
λ(1990−2001)+ : whereas the post-2001 GDP cannot catch up with the asymptotic 1990–
2001 trend, there was hope before the current global recession that it would overtake
the continuation of the pre–1990 trend.
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Figure 4: Scaled real GDP of the United Kingdom with four fits corresponding to
different episodes of economic growth.
UK f λ+ λ−
1990–1995 (0–18) 0.53± 0.09 0.028± 0.005 −0.049± 0.010
1995–2001 (19–43) 0.98± 0.01 0.0092± 0.0005 −0.151± 0.106
2001–2004 (43–55) 0.96± 0.02 0.0090± 0.0012 −0.154± 0.073
2004–2008 (55–71) 0.98± 0.02 0.0074± 0.0012 −0.168± 0.241
Table 2: Result of the fits of Eq. (1) to the real GDP of the United Kingdom.
The analysis of the United Kingdom from 1990 to 2008 tells us the same story (see
Fig. 4). There a first clear recession/recovery pattern beginning in 1990; the results of
the fit are reported in table, which indicate that the growth rate was unsustainable; it
is in fact related to a real estate bubble. After the latter broke up in 1995, two more
shocks can be seen in 2001 and 2004. The fits of these three last parts give consistent
results: their asymptotic growth rates λ+ =0.0092, 0.0090, 0.0074 are comparable;
they correspond to an annual growth of slighty more than 3%. The point is that none
of these three shocks did lead to a recession, but all of them interrupted the trend of
the GDP. Each of these negative shocks are not large, but each of them is associated
with a loss of absolute GDP in the asymptotic regime. The last shock of the time series
corresponds of course to the ongoing recession.
These two examples strongly suggest that economic shocks come in all sizes and
that the function we propose is able to capture what happens to the GDP after them,
hence the claim that Eq. (1) is the dynamical response function of the GDP.
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2.3 Making predictions
Since this model fits well real data between two shocks, it must be able to make pre-
dictions assuming that no additional shock occurs, and by extension, should be able
to detect an additional shock. Let us first start with noisy synthetic data in order to
understand better its predictive power. Generating time series G(t) = [ f eλ+t +(1−
f )eλ−t ][1+νη(t)] where η(t) are drawn at random from a unit-variance Gaussian dis-
tribution with zero average and ν is the strength of the noise. The issue is to determine
the minimum length of data needed in order to determine faithfully the parameters, in
particular if from a partial time series one can predict the future evolution of the GDP.
Choosing parameters that loosely replicate the evolution of the quarterly real GDP
of Finland ( f = 0.75, λ+ = 0.0125, λ−=−0.169), and ν= 0.005, we generate a single
200-time steps time series (50 years). Taking an in-sample size of t0 ∈ {5, . . . ,200},
we then find in the out-sample tpred > t0 such that the relative difference between the
prediction differs and the data at tpred exceeds the tolerance p = 0.01, · · · ,0.05. Even if
tpred as a function of t0 depends on each realisation of the noise, a general pattern arises:
at around t0 = 15− 17, which includes a part of the recovery, the prediction length
increases tremendously, although at first with very large fluctuations whose details de-
pend on the noise realisation, and reaches quickly the total length of the generated time
series.
2.4 Detecting additional shocks
Armed with this positive conclusion, we apply the same procedure to the real quarterly,
seasonally-adjusted, GDP of Finland. Fig. 5 clearly shows a saturation of tpred ≃ 42 for
t0 ≥ 23 even when the tolerance p increases (at which point one can predict the GDP
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Figure 6: Finland’s real GDP as a function of time, starting in October 1990. Red
circles: quarterly data, green line: in-sample fit, black dashed line : out-sample predic-
tion, blue line: fit starting from the 2001 slowdown, black dotted line: continuation of
the pre-1990 GDP trend.
five years ahead) whereas the length of the time series is 71. This means that something
happens at t = 42, and indeed, it corresponds to the shock of the end of the Internet
bubble. By decreasing the analysis sensitivity to fluctuations p, additional shocks can
be detected. This is clear for p = 0.01: additional plateaux at t = 27 and 34 can be
seen. Where to stop for p is somewhat problematic for now and will be addressed in a
future work.
2.5 Shape rather than causes
It is enlightening to look at a few well-known papers in Economics on the transition
from communism to capitalism, e.g. Fischer and Sahay (2000); Sachs (1996); Popov
(2006), which review the numerous aspects and precepts of economic transition and
growth, together with various methodologies. On the one hand they are helpful re-
minders that an economy is an intricate system with many parameters of unknown
influence, each of which being worth discussing, hence, that the parameters in our
model are global measures of many processes of different types. On the other hand it
is curious to note that, if most of them did plot GDP versus time, to our knowledge
nobody tried to fit the time series of the GDP, which is all the more surprising since an
equation similar in fine to Eq. (1) (but derived from other hypotheses) is found in an
appendix of Popov (2006).
A major difference between the approach of the respected economists cited above
and the present fitting function is that we focus on the typical temporal pattern or shape
of recession and recovery after a shock (or the second one, when available) whereas,
very understandably, the economists are concerned with finding the causes of recession
9
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Figure 7: Synthetic GDP timeseries and two best exponential fits of the recession and
recovery parts.
and recovery and in particular of the variations between countries. Some means to
assess the importance of reforms mostly come from abstract discussions on political
economy. For instance, Fischer and Sahay (2000) singles out Uzbekistan and Belarus,
noting the apparent contradiction between their economic performance and lack of
reforms, nevertheless concluding that “[...] it is reasonable to predict that they will
grow more slowly than those who have undertaken more extensive reforms.” However,
our fits indicate that their parameters are in line with those of Lithuania in current
dollars and Latvia in constant dollars.
One of the other tools widely used is factor analysis (known as multivariate lin-
ear fit in other disciplines) of the average growth in the recession and recovery parts
(separately), where potentially relevant variables are guessed and then deemed actually
relevant or not by statistical tests, yielding a regression coefficient R2 ≃ 0.5; the major
problem of this approach is that the decline and growth rates are evaluated on curves
that are not exponentials but a superposition of several of them. Thus, neglecting the
real curvature of the GDP gives biased estimates of both the decline and recovery rates,
as illustrated in Fig. 7, which may explain in part the poor R2 obtained by factor analy-
sis. But it does make sense to apply this method to the fitted parameters ( f , λ+, λ−) in
order to determine why the economic initial cer onditions were so different. It is worth
to remark that f does provide an important additional piece of information about the
economy. We leave it to forthcoming publications.
Since our model is the simplest one to respect the underlying economic processes,
it may not be entirely faithful, but its definition should not be over-interpreted. For
instance, its success only says that the economy behaves very similarly to a two-sector
approximation. It does not imply that the economy can be split into two parts inside
which growth rates are equal (see also section 3.1).
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3 A simple theoretical model of economic activity trans-
fer
The model used to fit data in the previous section can be derived from a simplifica-
tion of the so-called AB model (Snherb et al. 2000; Shnerb et al. 2001), a reaction-
diffusion lattice model where discrete particles of two types diffuse, meet, reproduce
and die auto-catalytically. Yaari et al. (2008) applied it recently to explain the temporal
and spatial dynamics of economic growth in Poland. Whereas the latter work divided
Poland into N interacting geographical parts with diffusing elementary economic units,
the present contribution is to show that the same model with N = 2 is able to explain
the temporal dynamics of many countries in difficult times. This allows us to restrict
the number of parameters, hence, to explore more easily the dynamical properties of
such models. It should also be noted that a sector can be either geographical, industrial,
or abstract.
The rationale behind this model is the following. The after-shock economy is
supposed to consist in two sectors, one with activity w1, growing intrinsically at rate
α1 > 0, and the other one with activity w2 but intrinsically shrinking (α2 < 0). They
interact through economic activity transfer taking place at rate β, according to the dif-
ference of activity. Mathematically,
∂w1(t)
∂t = α1w1(t)+β[〈w(t)〉−w1(t)] (2)
∂w2(t)
∂t = α2w2(t)+β[〈w(t)〉−w2(t)], (3)
where 〈w〉= (w1 +w2)/2.
The actual result of the government’s and investor’s various policies is assumed
to be equivalent to taking a fraction β/2 of the difference of activity between the two
sectors from the largest sector and giving it to the smallest one. In other words, β may
not be the transfer rate wished for by the government, but the actual transfer rate (the
distinction is valid for the rest of the discussion). This means in particular that, when
the intrinsically expanding sector represents a small part of the economy, resources are
transferred to it from the shrinking sector, thereby accelerating the transition. Note that
because of redistribution, both sectors end up growing at the same rate. Therefore, it
is wrong to think of the dynamics of this model as describing a growing sector and a
declining sector since both have a growing and a declining part.
Solving the dynamics of this system is straightforward by computing the eigenval-
ues and associated eigenvectors of the above coupled dynamical equations, following
standard procedure. The two eigenvalues are
λ± =
δ[σ/δ− ζ±√1+ ζ2]
2
(4)
where δ = α1 −α2, σ = α1 +α2 and ζ = β/δ. These eigenvalues correspond to the
rates measured in the previous section. The unnormalised eigenvectors are (ζ,−1±√
1+ ζ2). Let us denote by v± = (v±.1,v±2) the respective orthonormal eigenvectors.
Following standard procedure, one decomposes w(t = 0) into the basis v±, obtaining
w(t) = ω+v+eλ+t +ω−v−eλ−t where ω± = w(0).v± are the projections of the initial
conditions onto the sector decomposition described above. In other words, both w1
and w2 have an increasing and a decreasing part. The steady state is reached when the
importance of the negative component is vanishingly small compared to the positive
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component both for w1 and w2. The typical time for reaching this asymptotic regime is
O(1/(λ++ |λ−|)) units of time. Then the two groups grow at the same rate, λ+ (Fig.
11). In this regime, the growth of the negative component is entirely due to the transfer
of economic activity from the positive component.
We shall be interested in this paper in the total economic activity W = w1 +w2
and shall consider the GDP as its proxy. Also we are interested in the dynamics of
inequality between the sectors, measured by ∆ = w1/w2. Note that the empirical data
determine only partially the parameters of Eq. (1) of previous section: while the rates
λ± can be measured directly, more detailed information is needed in order to determine
all three parameters α1, α2 and β. This is due to the fact that f does not correspond
directly to w1(0) since even at the beginning sector 2 has a growing part (i.e. v+2 6= 0).
3.1 Why this model works
The contrast between the intricacies of economic policy making and implementation
(Fischer and Sahay 2000) and the simplicity of our model on the one hand, and the
quality of our fits and the (relatively) poor explanatory power of factor-based growth
analysis (Fischer and Sahay 2000; Popov 2006) on the other hand is perplexing. In
order to understand the surprisingly good performance of the simple fitting function
of Eq. (1), one needs to go back to the two-dimensional autocatalytic AB model of
Snherb et al. (2000), which describes spatially-distributed and heterogeneous logistic
systems. Its ability to reproduce both the spatial and temporal dynamics of Poland’s
GDP is striking (Yaari et al. 2008); interestingly, it finds that the local level of education
is the most relevant factor in growth, in line with Fischer and Sahay (2000). In the case
of Poland, it predicted successfully the pattern of recession and recovery of the parts
of Poland: the activity of each part of the country reaches its minimum at different
times, while the final growth rate is the same for all parts, strongly suggesting that an
economic activity transfer process is at work; in other words, plotting the economic
activity evolution of various sectors as a function of time produces a whole variety
of J-shaped time-series, all ending up with the same growth rate. The simplification
to two parts, or two sectors, works because the economy is an autocatalytic, that is,
multiplicative, process: the parts that reach their minima later than the best part often
have shrunk so much that their contribution to the total GDP is negligible afterwards.
The use of quarterly data for Finland and the UK, as shown above, seems to indicate
that the fitting equation we propose describes very well the GDP.
3.2 Static policy making
Assume that the rate α1 and α2 are constant and fixed by constraints beyond the con-
trol of the government. The government’s only influence is in the transfer rate through
the tax rate policy. This in itself is a very powerful instrument that the government is
pressed to use: indeed economic activity is linked to employment, and a fast-shrinking
sector implies growing social inequality and voters dissatisfaction. If the rate of shrink-
ing is much faster than the rate of labour transfer between the two sectors, inequality
at the sector level translates into growing social inequality. In that sense, the inequality
between sectors is an upper bound to social inequality. It should be noted that β is the
effective rate of transfer, not the one hoped for by the government; indeed, if the latter
is not able to collect taxes or if its authority is undermined by inadequate rule of law
due to the collapse of institutions, the effective β may turn out much smaller.
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The final growth rate depends much on the policy: increasing β reduces both eigen-
values, hence the total growth rate in the steady state: maximal asymptotic economic
growth is achieved when there are no transfer of wealth. This seems to substantiate
the claims of the so-called supply-side economics (see e.g. Lucas (1990)). However,
global growth rate is not the only success measure of a taxation policy: inequality is
also to be taken into account.
Indeed, since λ− < 0, group 2 would simply disappear in the absence of redis-
tribution. Decision makers who only focus on growth will therefore take β as small
as socially responsible and electorally possible. Some others will try to minimise in-
equality between sectors. Since both w1 and w2 end up growing at the same speed, their
asymptotic ratio ∆ = limt→∞ w1(t)/w2(t) is a measure of economic inequality. Using
basic algebra, one finds that
∆ = v+,1/v+,2 = 1/(−1/ζ+
√
1+ ζ2)≃ 2/ζ = 2(α1−α2)/β (5)
if ζ ≪ 1, in which case reducing the sector inequality by a half requires to double the
transfer rate; in addition, sector inequality is proportional to the difference of growth
rate.
Since the rates are fixed by assumption, sector inequality only depends on the trans-
fer rate, not on initial conditions. Inequality ceases to exist only for large β, at the cost
of growth rate.
Therefore, assuming fixed transfer rate, a head of state of a country facing a re-
cession may be able to choose between a small but long recession with anemic final
growth, or a large but short-lasting recession with large final growth (Fig. 8). A cynical
politician would ensure that the wealth of the majority of voters has increased by the
end of his tenure or at least that the recovery has begun.
3.3 Gradualism versus shock therapy
All the Eastern European countries have experienced economic recession when switch-
ing from communism to capitalism. The variety of intrinsic growth and decline rates
and policies yielded vast differences between speed of recovery and depth of reces-
sion of various countries. Understandably a large corpus of literature investigates what
factors could explain this variety of behaviours (Sachs 1996; Fischer and Sahay 2000;
Popov 2006; Cernat 2002). In particular, the technique of making the transition abrupt
and short has been labelled as shock therapy (Kolodko 2000). The concept of shock
therapy has been the focus on long debates which have not been settled to this very day
(Lucas 1990). The other approach is called gradualism, and advocates to follow a more
gentle rhythm (Kolodko 2000).
Our model makes it possible to investigate this issue. We shall assume that α1
and α2 are intrinsic to the economy and therefore constant; the government influences
the economy by trying to adjust the effective transfer rate β(t). The shock therapy
consists in lowering abruptly β from the high level of communism to the small level of
capitalism. Gradualism implies a smoother mathematical function for β(t).
3.3.1 Constant policy: shock therapy
Figure 8 plots various scenarios for W (t) at constant β and shows the influence of
β on the outcome. The cases with small β correspond to shock therapy. They are
characterised by a deep recession and both a faster final growth rate and accordingly a
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Figure 8: Total economic output versus time for various values of the transfer rate β
(α1 = 0.02, α2 = −0.05, w1(0) = 0.1, w2(0) = 0.9), and the (virtual) upper envelope
of all curves (thick black line).
higher GDP. Therefore, after many years, the tenants of this policy are vindicated since
their courageous but harsh recommendations are proved correct as regards the growth
rate of GDP and value compared to other static policies. This view is right, but only
in a static context, as it maximises the final growth rate, not the instantaneous one,
therefore not the actual GDP (see below), and deep recession ensues.
3.3.2 Dynamical policy: envelope
Few experiences are more frustrating for a politician than to have implemented a policy
that will lead to the recovery of one’s country, but too late to be re-elected. Instead of
heroically jeopardising one’s political career, one should ask how to implement a policy
that would avoid most troubles.
There is another way of looking at this figure: what if one could stay on the upper
envelope of all the scenarios and thereby avoiding as much as possible difficult times
while maximising the final growth rate? This clearly needs a dynamical policy, i.e.,
β(t). Running a thousand scenarios Wi(t) with various βi, and selecting at each time t
the value of β that corresponds to the maximal W yields βenv(t) = βargmaxi Wi(t) shown
in Fig. 8: redistribution should be kept maximal for a while, then βenv decreases ex-
ponentially fast in the region encompassing the worst phase of the recession, and then
decreases faster than exponentially. Regretfully for a head of state, this view is purely
virtual: Figure 9 reports the GDP W [βenv] actually obtained by using the policy βenv(t),
the envelope maxi Wi(t) of Fig. 2 and an example of shock therapy with constant β (for-
get Wopt for the time being). The difference between the virtual and real W come from
the fact that it is impossible to stay on the envelope by controlling β(t) on the basis of
W alone: when W (t)s of two scenarios cross, their components w1(t) and w2(t) are not
equal. Thus shock therapy works better than trying to stay on the envelope.
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Figure 9: Total economic output W for the optimal policy (black line), the envelope-
based gradual policy (red lines) and the shock therapy (dashed black line). Same pa-
rameters as in Fig 2.
Curiously, W (t) actually obtainable by using this method is also relatively well fit-
ted with Eq. 1, i.e. with constant parameters, and gives for the curve reported in Fig.
8 λ+ ≃ 0.020, λ− ≃−0.019, and f = 0.068 with uncertainties smaller than a percent,
whereas the initial values were 0.02, -0.05 and 0.1, respectively. In other words, the
effective shrinking rate is reduced, the rate of growth of the expanding sector remains
unchanged (which is needed in order to retain the same final growth rate), while the
apparent fraction of the expanding sector decreases considerably; interestingly, the dif-
ference between the fits of the envelope itself and the attainable W (t) is limited to f :
the envelope has the same apparent f as the individual runs.
3.3.3 Optimal policy: maximal W
Another policy is to maximising W at each time step, which reduces to the maximi-
sation of the growth rate with respect to β: ∂ ˙W∂β = 0. This leads to a transcendental
equation to be solved numerically at each time step. The resulting Wβopt is reported
in Fig. 9, which shows unambiguously the benefits of the proposed optimal dynami-
cal policy, that is, of gradualism with respect to shock therapy. Indeed, the value of
the GDP in the recovery phase is increased several times with respect to static policies
and with respect to envelope-based dynamical policies, while sharing the same asymp-
totic growth rate. We therefore claim that shock therapies are unadapted to economies
in crises as regards GDP. Patience and gradualism are better solutions in this kind of
situations.
Looking at the optimal value of β (Fig. 10) reveals that indeed taxes should decrease
rapidly, but not instantaneously. This means that the intuition behind shock therapies
is correct, but only in the later stages of the time evolution. What matters is the road
to minimum taxes, all the more since the economy follows multiplicative processes:
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Figure 10: Optimal value of the transfer rate β versus time for the envelope-based
policy (red line) and the optimal policy (black line). Same parameters as in Fig. 8.
optimising it may change tremendously the fate of countries and people, as shown by
the results of envelope-based and optimal policies.
Fitting Wβopt with Eq. (1) yields f ≃ 0.80, λ+ ≃ 0.20 and λ− ≃ −0.027. There-
fore, the optimal policy both increases the apparent fraction of the growing part of the
economy and decreases the apparent rate of shrinking of the decaying sector, while of
course keeping constant the final rate of growth.
3.3.4 Detecting static, envelope-based, and optimal policies
A somewhat frustrating result of the previous two dynamical policies is the impossi-
bility to distinguish them from a static one. Indeed, in the absence of additional infor-
mation about the applied economic policies, one cannot reconstruct it from the GDP
time series. For that purpose, one would need data about at least two sectors. Plotting
∆ = w1/w2 as function of time allows one to distinguish a static, envelope-based and
optimal policy, as reported in Fig. 11: a static policy has a negative curvature, while
dynamic ones start with a flat line, followed with a positive curvature and then an inflex-
ion point. All of them reach the same asymptotic values since one imposed a minimum
β = 0.00001 in order to compare the three policies. It may be difficult in practice to
discriminate with the naked eye an envelope-based policy from the optimal one, but
easy to detect a static policy 1. However, in further investigations one could measure
w1 and w2, and thus determine all the parameters of the model, including βopt(t).
1It is clear that increasing taxes will also lead to a negative curvature; however, we assume that the
transition from communism to capitalism needs a decrease of taxes.
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Figure 11: Sector inequality as a function of time for the optimal policy (black line),
the envelope-based gradual policy (red line) and the shock therapy (dashed black line).
Same parameters as in Fig 2.
4 Discussion
The idea that the dynamics of economies is affected by shocks is by no means new (see
e.g. Slutzky (1937)). The contribution of the present work is to show that a rare single
negative shock, well defined in time, has a lasting influence on the GDP evolution
because of the existence of an intrinsic response function and that it is sufficient to lead
to a recession.
We claim that the simple function of Eq (1) is at the very least a very good approxi-
mation to the response function: it fits well the GDP of countries in various continents,
at various levels of industrialisation, at different times, short and long recessions after
large shocks, and even small bumps after small shocks. This is indeed what can be
expected from a response function. In addition, it suggests that the GDP time series are
quite smooth between infrequent shocks.
It may be argued that relying on shocks to justify deviations of the GDP from the
fitting equation is bad practice, hence, that splitting time series into segments, each
of them obeying the fitting function amounts to relegate some part of the problem to
external causes. This would be the case if the fitting function could not work for more
than a few points, i.e. if the pseudo-shocks were relatively frequent. In addition, the
fact that the fits are even more impressive for quarterly data is a strong argument in
favour of our equation. It remains that the shocks themselves deserve a more thorough
study, which is left to future work. In particular, one has to find a statistical criterion
for the splitting of a time series into segments, and to address the problem of shocks
that propagate gradually to a given economy, yielding a concave GDP at the start of
recessions, possibly needing to consider a dynamical fraction f .
Although we gave intuitive and simple theoretical arguments to motivate the mathe-
matical shape of this function, one ideally wishes also to build a model whose response
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function to external shocks is compatible with our findings. We are not aware of any.
Finally, our model suggests that lasting recessions are smooth curves when viewed
at quarterly data level. This means in particular that they have a well-marked minimum
corresponding to several quarters of sluggish growth; therefore, hopes to avoid that
part of the curve are misguided. It is hard to make predictions of the GDP evolution
regarding current recessions first because there are only three or four quarterly data
estimates, which are often revised in a sizeable proportion in times of recessions, and
also because currently available quarterly data does not show any unambibuous sign of
inflexion.
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A Model fitting
In the following tables, SRS stands for square residuals sum, SRM for square residu-
als mean, RSRS for relative square residuals sum, RSRM for relative square residuals
mean; years indicates the number of years along which the fit has been done. The table
contains a wealth of data which can be further exploited and whose potential has been
only scratched by the present publication.
Country first year last year f eλ+ eλ− SRS SRM RSRS RSRM years
Albania 1990 2006 59.5 1.064 0.367 301.97 17.763 402.92 23.701 17
Bahamas 1990 1999 70.8 1.061 0.662 4.6524 0.4652 4.4493 0.4449 10
Belarus 1991 2006 38.0 1.089 0.737 151.97 9.4982 241.12 15.070 16
Bolivia 1981 1998 61.9 1.049 0.775 16.529 0.9183 18.257 1.0143 18
Chile 1981 1997 51.2 1.079 0.522 56.499 3.3235 37.112 2.1830 17
Estonia 1990 2006 40.7 1.083 0.688 148.97 8.7630 211.69 12.452 17
Finland 1990 2006 82.1 1.036 0.367 79.249 4.6617 65.940 3.8788 17
Hungary 1989 2006 64.0 1.046 0.694 38.588 2.1438 45.955 2.5530 18
Kazakhstan 1990 2006 84.4 0.837 1.138 105.23 6.1903 186.39 10.964 17
Latvia 1990 2006 27.4 1.087 0.651 245.92 14.466 508.97 29.939 17
Lithuania 1990 2006 31.1 1.082 0.723 214.11 12.594 411.24 24.191 17
Mongolia 1990 2005 64.5 1.045 0.615 156.65 9.7910 143.21 8.9512 16
Moldova 1990 2006 14.6 1.081 0.734 103.41 6.0834 395.19 23.246 17
Russia 1990 2006 20.4 1.100 0.825 102.63 6.0373 181.19 10.658 17
Slovakia 1990 2006 72.9 1.042 0.367 102.28 6.0170 95.323 5.6072 17
Slovenia 1990 2006 79.5 1.040 0.367 29.452 1.7324 27.235 1.6020 17
Sweden 1990 2006 88.1 1.029 0.549 28.900 1.7000 23.565 1.3861 17
Turkmenistan 1990 2006 29.9 1.080 0.809 291.63 17.154 538.89 31.699 17
Ukraine 1990 2006 6.71 1.153 0.835 241.22 14.189 656.64 38.626 17
Uzbekistan 1990 2006 42.6 1.074 0.829 77.763 4.5743 87.654 5.1561 17
Bulgaria 1988 1995 0.17 1.967 0.929 22.261 2.7827 30.514 3.8143 8
Bulgaria 1995 2005 64.5 1.051 0.463 5.0247 0.4567 6.0662 0.5514 11
Czechia 1990 1996 75.0 1.047 0.422 3.3792 0.4827 4.2602 0.6086 7
Czechia 1996 2006 38.1 1.102 0.927 5.8393 0.5308 5.3579 0.4870 11
Romania 1990 1996 60.4 1.075 0.526 6.2065 0.8866 8.4506 1.2072 7
Romania 1996 2006 60.3 1.070 0.656 9.3063 0.8460 9.1387 0.8307 11
Table 3: GDP in current dollars
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Country first year last year f eλ+ eλ− SRS SRM RSRS RSRM years
Albania 1989 2004 51.0 1.064 0.514 341.56 21.347 567.59 35.474 16
Bahamas 1990 2000 52.8 1.075 0.863 4.4978 0.4088 4.5325 0.4120 11
Belarus 1990 2004 26.6 1.106 0.834 278.38 18.559 437.38 29.158 15
Bolivia 1981 1998 61.0 1.050 0.793 19.853 1.1029 21.966 1.2203 18
Chile 1981 1998 73.1 1.076 0.367 167.27 9.2928 51.868 2.8815 18
Estonia 1989 2004 35.2 1.080 0.748 204.50 12.781 362.29 22.643 16
Finland 1990 2004 81.2 1.036 0.392 61.378 4.0919 53.024 3.5349 15
Hungary 1989 2004 60.9 1.048 0.701 41.342 2.5838 48.124 3.0077 16
Kazakhstan 1990 2004 10.5 1.170 0.857 71.987 4.7991 129.56 8.6377 15
Latvia 1989 2004 24.9 1.090 0.740 305.80 19.113 655.52 40.970 16
Lithuania 1990 1998 4.42 1.352 0.830 122.13 13.571 217.51 24.167 9
Lithuania 1998 2004 84.9 1.081 0.422 2.3325 0.3332 1.5147 0.2163 7
Mongolia 1990 1995 0.31 2.701 0.899 1.6940 0.2823 2.5702 0.4283 6
Mongolia 1995 2004 11.7 1.173 1 64.007 6.4007 45.001 4.5001 10
Moldova 1989 2004 2.56 1.200 0.843 359.69 22.480 913.24 57.078 16
Russia 1989 2004 5.19 1.185 0.895 191.79 11.987 341.91 21.369 16
Slovakia 1989 1998 37.1 1.106 0.778 91.756 9.1756 122.02 12.202 10
Slovakia 1998 2004 83.5 1.063 0.753 0.2443 0.0349 0.2118 0.0302 7
Slovenia 1990 2004 79.4 1.039 0.367 25.088 1.6725 23.178 1.5452 15
Sweden 1990 2004 89.0 1.029 0.508 32.082 2.1388 26.378 1.7585 15
Turkmenistan 1990 2001 0.12 1.744 0.908 183.33 15.277 359.04 29.920 12
Ukraine 1989 2004 0.61 1.330 0.882 274.88 17.180 812.32 50.770 16
Uzbekistan 1990 2004 49.1 1.063 0.802 69.781 4.6520 83.878 5.5918 15
Bulgaria 1988 1995 0.15 1.968 0.929 22.327 2.7909 30.615 3.8269 8
Bulgaria 1995 2004 74.1 1.050 0.452 4.6503 0.4650 5.8248 0.5824 10
Czechia 1990 1996 74.8 1.047 0.427 3.3822 0.4831 4.2688 0.6098 7
Czechia 1996 2004 86.9 1.035 0.649 4.3757 0.4861 4.0627 0.4514 9
Romania 1988 1996 2.67 1.411 0.901 61.438 6.8265 95.846 10.649 9
Romania 1996 2004 55.3 1.090 0.729 3.6354 0.4039 4.0334 0.4481 9
Table 4: GDP in constant dollars
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